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alternative does not seem very practical, and the second one is
obviously unsatisfactory. 4 The moving of plants may, thus, be
greatly hindered. The impact would be greatest on the South, which,
having a labor surplus as a result of mechanization of agriculture,
has been trying to attract industry through special concessions in
addition to its low-cost labor supply. Tennessee, for example, has
had 1,065 new plants established between 1953 and 1960, creating
122,050 new jobs; seventy per cent of these plants have moved from
other states.5 If the decision is upheld, our country may have lost
an important safety valve in its economy, which has assisted us in
remaining competitive in world markets.
David C. Briggs
Separate Gates and Secondary Picketing
Petitioner Union, comprised of the majority of the working force
at an appliance construction plant, struck against the company.
Picketing by Petitioner was carried on at each of five gates serving
as entrances and exits for the plant. Gate 3-A, one of the five gates
picketed, had for four years prior to this strike been confined to the
use of employees of independent contractors who work on the
premises. Automobiles and persons were checked for authorization
to enter Gate 3-A and a sign was prominently posted to inform
company employees to use other entrances. The nearest entrance
available for use by company employees was 550 feet away. On rare
occasions, in violation of company policies, a company employee
was allowed to enter Gate 3-A. As a result of the picketing of Gate
3-A, almost all of the employees of independent contractors refused
to enter the company premises. The federal district court enjoined
picketing two weeks after it had begun. Subsequently, the National
Labor Relations Board ruled that the Union's picketing was a viola-
tion of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.' After enforcement of the Board's decision by the
"'A company could also, of course, offer its employees their "vested rights" at the new
plant, hoping they would not all elect to move. However, the company would risk losing
much of the advantage in moving if many employees decided to go along.
"SThe Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1961, pp. 1, 4. Cheap power from T.V.A. was a
possible additional motivating factor.
'Section 8(b)(4)(A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
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court of appeals,2 certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.
Held: Picketing is prohibited by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) where there
is a separate clearly marked gate for the exclusive use of employees
of independent contractors if they are performing tasks unconnected
with the normal operations of the struck employer.' Local 761,
IUEW v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 677 (1961).
Prior to 1937 picketing of all forms was usually considered prima
facie a tort to be proven lawful.' However, beginning early in this
century courts began to differentiate between picketing which was
peaceful and that which was not, and between employee and non-
employee picketing.! Thus, peaceful picketing by employees was
accorded legality. Even though the Supreme Court refused to recog-
nize picketing as being within "speech" in its 1921 consideration of
picketing and constitutional liberties,' earlier in that same term the
Court defined "peaceful picketing" and prescribed conditions under
which it might be considered legal. ' These conditions continued to
govern peaceful picketing until 1937. During that period, Congress
accorded protection from federal injunction to peaceful picketing
through the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932." In 1937, two years
after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act"° and creation
of the National Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court held
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . to cease doing business
with any other person ....
2278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
'However, the Court reversed and remanded the case to establish the scope of work
performed by the employees of the independent contractors who used the separate gate.
'E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (S.D. Iowa 1905); Re Langell,
178 Mich. 305, 144 N.W. 841 (1914); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union,
118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1898). The tort was the interference and intimidation of
employees and customers.
'E.g., Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908);
Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 Fed. 148 (N.D. Ohio 1906); State v. Stockford, 77
Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769 (1904); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y.
260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
6 E.g., Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S.E. 236 (1908);
Chicago Typographical Union v. Barnes, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908). But see
Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188, 53 S.E. 273 (1906).
7 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
8American Steel Foundaries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184
(1921). Chief Justice Taft writing the majority opinion held that peaceful picketing had
to do (1) with the number of picketers, "one representative for each point of ingress
and egress," id. at 206, (2) with the place of picketing, specifying that the employer
should not be obstructed in access to his place of business, ibid., and (3) with the be-
havior of the picketers, "persistence . . . or dogging" condemned as well as "abusive,
libelous or threatening" language, id. at 207.
9 Section 4 (e), 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). Injunctions were prohibited
issuance against "Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by . . . patrolling, or any other method not involving fraud or vio-
lence. .. ."
'o 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
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that one of the aims of picketing was communication," and three
years later, Justice Murphy incorporated picketing into the com-
munication of ideas constitutionally protected by the first and four-
teenth amendments." States were almost wholly denied rights of regu-
lation over peaceful picketing regardless of its effects on third
parties." However, when Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe 4 came be-
fore the Court in 1942 it was made clear that picketing, even though
peaceful, could have adverse "secondary" effects on innocent third
parties and that such picketing should not be protected against state
regulation. In Bakery Drivers Union v. Wohl," a companion case
to Ritter's Cafe, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion affirmed the
constitutional protection of picketing and also proclaimed the type
of picketing which was to be regulated, now called "secondary
picketing."" The Taft-Hartley Act, an amendment to the National
Labor Relations Act, passed in 1947,' set out unfair labor practices
and made certain types of picketing enjoinable." Thus, a problem
was forged in striking a balance between constitutionally protected
picketing which inherently possessed the salient purpose of inducing
employees and the public to take sides with the picketers" and the
right of innocent businessmen who are economically affected to be
protected."
Senator Taft stated that one of the purposes of the Taft-Hartley
Act was to return, via Section 8 (b) (4), to the common law gov-
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
"3AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941). Here the Court allowed a union repre-
senting none of the employees to picket the employer due to "the interdependence of
economic interests of all engaged in the same industry ....
14 315 U.S. 722 (1942). Here the picketers patrolled the cafe of Ritter over a dispute
concerning construction work being done for Ritter on a building unconnected with his
restaurant.
"5 315 U.S. 769 (1942). The union picketed wholesale bakeries which sold goods to
non-union, self-employed peddlers, and retail grocers who bought from them. The pur-
pose was to compel the peddlers, who had seriously undermined union standards, to observe
union hours and to hire union relief drivers. The Supreme Court reversed a New York
injunction and found the union had a legitimate interest.
"6 Id. at 776:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation.
"¢ Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1958).
"Section 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958).
"International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL (Schultz Refrig. Service, Inc.), 87 N.L.R.B.
502, 25 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1949).
'° Supra note 17. The caption of the Act read, 61 Stat. 136 (1947):
An Act to amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide additional
facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize
legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other pur-
poses.
erning secondary boycotts and picketing. 1 Nowhere did Section
8 (b) (4) make reference to primary or secondary activity.22 How-
ever, those concerned with the Act alluded to "secondary" boycotts
and picketing as an expression covering a multitude of union prac-
tices invoked against neutral employers.2 Yet, while it seems plain
that "secondary" was not a geographical reference, there developed
a line of cases under the Act that considered the place of activity
in distinguishing between primary and secondary activity. Picket-
ing at the premises of a secondary employer who was a purchaser
from the primary employer involved in the dispute was held to
be illegal picketing from either the secondary relation of the picketed
party to the dispute or from the geographical restriction of the sec-
ondary situs24 The view of "primary" as physical was evidenced in
Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO (Pure Oil Co.)"5 where the National
Labor Relations Board found that secondary effects from picketing
at the primary employer's immediate premises did not make the
picketing illegal or secondary." This physical aspect of "primary"
was followed in United Electrical Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.),27
a common situs case, i.e., where the primary and secondary employers
occupy a common work place. There, as in the principal case, a
separate gate for the ingress and egress of the employees of the sec-
ondary employer was picketed by employees of the primary em-
ployer. The Board found that this picketing of the separate gate
did not enlarge the area of dispute and did not violate Section
8 (b) (4) (A) 2" although the picketing had a secondary effect. The
premises in the Ryan case were owned by the struck employer, but
2193 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947):
[U]nder the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act it became impossible to
stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter how un-
lawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the bill does
is reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.
22 See note 18 supra.
" See the remarks of Senators Pepper and Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 4322-23 (1947);
remarks of Senator Ellender, 93 Cong. Rec. 4255 (1947); and remarks of Senator Ball,
93 Cong. Rec. 4138 (1947).
24United Bhd. of Carpenters (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 23 L.R.R.M.
1403 (1949).
2584 N.L.R.B. 315, 24 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1949).26 1d. at 318:
A strike, by its very nature, inconveniences those who customarily do
business with the struck employer. Moreover, any accompanying picketing of
the employer's premises is necessarily designed to induce and encourage third
persons to cease doing business with the picketed employer. It does not follow,
however, that such picketing is therefore proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
of the Act.
27 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 24 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1949).
" At this point in time the discussion concerns Section 8 (b) (4) (A) as it read before
the 1959 amendment, discussed infra note 41, which changed the wording but is the result
of the judicial and legislative history developed from the pre-1959 Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
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in Sailors' Union, AFL (Moore Dry Dock)," also a common situs
case like Ryan, the premises were owned by the secondary employer.
The Moore Dry Dock case did not follow the secondary situs rule
of the Wadsworth Bldg. Co. case" as the Ryan case followed the
primary situs rule of Pure Oil Co. However, certain definite stand-
ards were set forth in Moore Dry Dock which had to be met to
avoid the Wadsworth decision and rule.3' The standards set out
were strictly applied and the courts found picketing at common,
secondary premises automatically illegal if any one of the stand-
ards was lacking. 2 Subsequently, the Moore Dry Dock standards
were applied to a primary, common situs case," thus unifying second-
ary and primary, common situs situations into the same criteria of
consideration.
Prior to that decision by the Board, the interest of the Supreme
Court in the location of the picketing had decreased as their con-
cern with the secondary effect of the picketing grew,"0 and their
language in the Rice Milling case indicated that the mere location
of the picketing was not conclusive as to its legality." This attitude
toward the effect of the picketing was paramount in the Retail
Fruit Dealers decision handed down by the Board in 1956."' That
decision added another standard to the Moore Dry Dock test: the
requirement that picketers make a "bona fide effort to minimize
the secondary effect of picketing." 7 Due to the legal necessity of all
2992 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950). The Moore Dry Dock Case is some-
times referred to as a "roving situs" case in reference to the fact that the picketing
involved therein was mobile and followed the struck employer's jobs to various sites.
" United Bhd. of Carpenters (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 23 L.R.R.M.
1403 (1949).
" Sailors' Union, AFL (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108
(1950):
(a) picketing strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located
on secondary employer's premises; (b) at time of picketing, primary employer
is engaged in normal business at situs; (c) limited to places reasonably close
to location of situs; and (d) it discloses clearly that the dispute is with the
primary employer.
2 See, e.g., Superior Derrick Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 43 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1958),
enforced in part and rev'd in part, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960); Local 728, Teamsters
Union, 111 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 35 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1955), enforced, 228 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.
1956).3 3 Local 55 (PBM), 108 N.L.R.B. 363, 34 L.R.R.M. 1010, enforced, 218 F.2d 226
(10th Cir. 1954).
34 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).3 1 Id. at 671.
" Local 1017, Retail Clerks Union, AFL-CIO (Retail Fruit Dealers), 116 N.L.R.B.
856, 38 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
3' 116 N.L.R.B. at 859. This additional condition enunciated in Retail Friit Dealers is
not to be confused with the so-called "fifth condition" added to the Moore Dry Dock test
by Brewery Drivers, AFL (Washington Coca-Cola Co.), 107 N.L.R.B. 299, 33 L.R.R.M.
1122 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The latter condition resulted
from another objective consideration by the court of the physical aspects of the picketing.
[Vol. 16
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the Moore Dry Dock standards being fulfilled" this addition of
subjectiveness which was inherent in the "bona fide effort" standard
accorded much importance to the determination of whether the sec-
ondary effects were controllable and whether the picketing had an ob-
ject legitimately connected with the primary dispute 9 (with that ob-
ject being ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the picket-
ing)." The statutory recognition of the "object" determination is
exhibited by the amended Section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor
Relations Act which now begins with operative language describing
the kinds of union action prohibited if "an object" is one of the
purposes set forth in clauses (A), (B), (C), or (D). Therefore,
although the word "primary" is given statutory dignity for the first
time by the 1959 Amendment, it seems that its meaning has not been
changed and that the same standards should be applied in common
situs picketing as were applied under, and derived from, Section
8 (b) (4) of Taft-Hartley."
The reserved gate cases have been decided by applying the "object"
test to the picketing," as these cases did not seem to present any
Picketing of the primary employer at a secondary employer's premises was permissible if
the primary employer had no permanent place of business. That condition has met with
varying acceptance. Accord, e.g., NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, 272 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1959); NLRB v. United Steel Workers, 250 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1959); NLRB v.
General Drivers Union, 251 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1958). But see Truck Drivers & Helpers v.
NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Sales Drivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1955).
as See text accompanying note 32 suPra.
9 Local 618, Automotive Union, AFL-CIO (Incorporated Oil Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 1844,
1847, 39 L.R.R.M. 1106 (1956), enforcement denied, 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1957) (de-
cided about the same time as Retail Fruit Dealers):
[T]he General Counsel need only prove an object of the picketing activity
was to compel the neutral . . . to cease doing business with the struck em-
ployer ...
4 Superior Derrick Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 43 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1958), enforced
in part and rev'd in part, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960); Seafarers' International Union, 119
N.L.R.B. 1638, 41 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1958), order set aside, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Local 1017, Retail Clerks Union, AFL-CIO (Retail Fruit Dealers), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 38
L.R.R.M. 1323 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
"' Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 73
Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1959). This is the point in time at which
the wording of this section was changed as anticipated in note 28 supra, and as set out
in note 1 supra. Noticeable is the added provision to the effect that "nothing contained in
[the] clause . . .shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing."
421bid.; Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959):
The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that the changes in 8 (b) (4)
do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law permitting picketing at
the site of the primary labor dispute. This provision does not eliminate,
restrict, or modify the limitations on picketing at the site of the primary
labor dispute that are in existing law. See for example . . . Moore Dry
Dock . . ..
" The evolution of the reserved gate treatment by the Board and the courts is exem-
plified by the chronological sequence following: (1) Atomic Projects & Prod. Workers, 120
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peculiar situation warranting other considerations. Thus, where the
only object of picketing at the reserved gate was "to induce em-
ployees of any employer"" to cause a ceasing of business with the
struck employer the picketing was found illegal." The principal case,
however, has carved out an exception or qualification to that test
to be applied to separate gate cases.4" The nature of the work done
by the secondary employees will decide whether or not the object
test should be applied.47 Therefore, the "object" test will apply only
where the work of secondary employees is "unrelated to the normal
operations of the employer and the work [is] of a kind that would
not, if done when the plant were engaged in its regular operations,
necessitate curtailing those operations."4 The Court in effect treated
those employees of independent contractors who performed con-
ventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of
General Electric as primary employees.4 This consideration was drawn
on by the Court because the Board's rationale in reserved gate cases"
had been applied "only to situations where the independent workers
were performing tasks unconnected to the normal operations of the
struck employer-usually construction work on his buildings.""
The Moore Dry Dock requirements are still good law but the
N.L.R.B. 400, 41 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1958), enforced sub nom., Office Employees Int'l Union
v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1959); (2) General Elec. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1547,
44 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1959), enforced sub non., Local 761, IUEW v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd and remanded, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); (3) Virginia-Carolina Chem.
Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 905, 45 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1960).
"Supra note 41.
4 Atomic Projects & Prod. Workers, 120 N.L.R.B. 400, 41 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1958),
enforced sub nom., Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In Gonzales Chem. Indus. Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1352, 46 L.R.R.M. 1423 (1960), rev'd sub
nom., Local 901, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the Board
found an illegal object where there was no separate gate and picketing occurred at the
single gate used by employees of both the struck employer and neutral contractors at times
when only the employees of neutrals were entering the premises. However, the court of
appeals reversed on the ground that a reserved gate was necessary to insulate neutrals under
the decision of the principal case. Query whether this necessity is proclaimed in the instant
case to protect neutrals, i.e., those persons doing work "unrelated to the normal operations"
of the struck employer.
46 366 U.S. at 681.
47 Ibid.
4s Ibid.
49 366 U.S. at 682:
[I]f Gate 3-A was in fact used by employees of independent contractors
who performed conventional maintenance work necessary to the normal
operations of General Electric, the use of the gate would have been a mingled
one outside the bar of § 8(b)(4)(A). [Emphasis added.]
5 Infra note 64.
'x 366 U.S. at 680.
"Ibid.:
With due regard to the relation between the Board's function and the scope
of judicial review of its rulings, the question is whether the Board may apply
the Dry Dock criteria so as to make unlawful picketing at a gate utilized
exclusively by employees of independent contractors who work on the struck
employer's premises.
NOTES
principal case qualifies their scope of operation.53 The object test is
still good law but its operation is also limited by this new considera-
tion of the nature of the secondary employees' work."5 The test in
the instant case was first set forth in United Steel-workers of America
v. NLRB. " The language in that case, "the work done by the men
who use the gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the
employer,"" was predicated on the fact that the secondary employees
being picketed were "neutral and were not the alter ego of the
employer, taking over its ordinary business and benefiting from the
strike."'" This language relates that test, adopted by the Court in
the principal case," to a line of cases involving picketing of strike-
breakers working under the guise of employees of independent con-
tractors.6 0 However, the Court in the principal case makes no such
inferred limitation of their language. 1 Consequently, the Supreme
Court in the instant case has expressly adopted the language of the
test without expressly adopting the limitation under which it was
posed, i.e., "taking over [of] ordinary business and benefiting from
the strike."'"
From the Board's decisions following the principal case it appears
that the limitation on the "normal operations" consideration, i.e.,
only to be considered in those cases where the secondary employees
were in effect strikebreakers carrying on the struck employer's opera-
tion,"3 will not be implied from the Court's adoption of the test
itself." Thus it appears a major expansion for picketing has been
affected by the decision in the principal case." The reason given
for the formulation and adoption of the test 6 is legally inadequate.
Merely because the Board decisions in previous reserve gate situations
" The qualification can be stated as: The Moore Dry Dock test will be applied if it
should be applied, i.e., if the picketed employees are not performing work related to the
normal operations of the struck employer's business.
54 366 U.S. at 679. The Court included the object test by inference in its reference to
the Moore Dry Dock test even though this standard was added by Retail Fruit Clerks case.
55 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
56289 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 1961).
57 366 U.S. at 681. The Court used the same language.
S"United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 1961).
5'366 U.S. at 681.
66IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Wine Workers, 178 F.2d
584 (2d Cir. 1949); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
" 366 U.S. at 681.
62 See text accompanying note 58 supra.63 Ibid.
64 E.g., Carrier Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 48 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1961); Steelworkers
Union (Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 45 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1960);
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 905, 45 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1960).
65 See the language set out in note 49 supra. The reference to the nature of the work
being performed is the springboard for expansion.
66 See the language accompanying note 51 supra.
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involved construction work unrelated to normal operations is no
reason to treat this factor as if it had been the controlling point of
the cases. To the contrary, this fact was never cited by the Board
as controlling in any reserved gate case. 7 It is difficult to understand
why the Court expanded the "nature-of-work consideration" in the
face of the statutory language which refers to secondary picketing
of "any employer." Therefore, it can reasonably be questioned
whether the Court meant to create the extended exception being in-
voked by the Board in "following" the decision in the instant case.
While the enunciation of the unlimited exception may be a puzzle,
so the criteria of its application is indefinite. The test requires
"exclusive use" of the gate by secondary employees," yet the Court
intimated that the few General Electric workers that were shown to
have entered through Gate 3-A did not obviate the "exclusive use"
by the secondary employees." Therefore, the exact dimensions of
exclusive use under the Court's test are unclear. More difficult, how-
ever, is the question of what is meant by "related to normal opera-
tions." The Court gave only two examples-both extreme-to guide
a determination of what shall be related to the normal operations of
the struck employer's business, i.e., construction work is not, and
pick up and delivery of products or material is, so related to be
primary and subject to picketing." It seems inevitable that litiga-
tion will be necessary to illuminate the gray area between construc-
tion unrelated to normal operations and the obviously related pick-
up and delivery service. And overshadowing this problem remains the
dual question whether this expanded exception was intended by the
Court and, if so, whether it was warranted by the amended language
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A).
Roy ]. True
07 It should be noted that those Board decisions cited in note 64 supra, although previous
to the principal case coming before the Supreme Court, were following the earlier decision
by the Board in their treatment of the instant case. It would seem as though the Court
would have viewed the basis of the Board's test and that of the lower court in the principal
case rather than Board decisions merely following the instant case before the Supreme Court
had rendered judgment as to its validity, legally and substantially.
08366 U.S at 681.
I d. at 682: "While the record shows some such mingled use, it sheds no light on its
extent." [Emphasis added]
70 Id. at 681.
[Vol. 16
